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CONFRONTING MEMORY LOSS 
 
Paul F. Rothstein & Ronald J. Coleman  
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment grants “the accused” in “all 
criminal prosecutions” a right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”1  The 
Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Crawford v. Washington governs modern 
Confrontation Clause analysis.2  Under the Crawford regime, the Confrontation Clause 
applies to hearsay statements offered against a criminal defendant pursuant to a hearsay 
exception or exemption, but only if such statements are the out-of-court equivalent of 
“bear[ing] testimony” at trial.3  These “testimonial” statements cannot be entered against a 
criminal defendant unless the hearsay declarant either (i) appears as a witness for cross-
examination, or (ii) is unavailable in a situation where there has been a prior sufficient 
opportunity for cross-examination of such declarant.4  While the Crawford opinion failed 
to fully define the class of testimonial statements, such class would seem to include out-
of-court statements which are meant or understood to offer some type of evidence at trial, 
in particular if such statements were made formally and directed to a state actor or agent.5 
One item which Crawford and its progeny have left unclear is whether a memory-
impaired witness can afford a criminal defendant her right to confront.  For instance, 
suppose a witness is testifying at trial, and the prosecution seeks to enter a prior testimonial 
statement that witness made to law enforcement.  Insofar as mere rules of evidence are 
concerned, aside from the Confrontation Clause, this might be admissible.6  Normally the 
fact that the witness is actually testifying at trial might be sufficient to meet the 
Confrontation Clause requirements for introduction of the prior statement.  However, now 
suppose that the testifying witness has suffered from some degree of memory loss since 
having made the prior statement, such that she cannot recall the prior statement and/or the 
                                                 
1 U.S. Const. amend. VI.  The Fourteenth Amendment ensures that the Confrontation Clause also applies at 
the state level.  Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965). 
2 See generally Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
3 Id. at 42-68.  Not all out-of-court statements are testimonial.  For instance, a statement which has the 
purpose of helping law enforcement meet an ongoing emergency—such as statements made to a 911 
operator prior to the perpetrator being under control—would likely be found nontestimonial.  See Davis v. 
Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).  Similarly, a statement in a medical report created for purposes of 
treating a patient—and without any contemplation it would be used against a future criminal defendant at 
trial—might also be found nontestimonial.  See Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein, A Game of Katso 
and Mouse: Current Theories for Getting Forensic Analysis Evidence Past the Confrontation Clause, 57 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 27 (2020) [hereinafter A Game of Katso and Mouse]. 
4 See generally Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
5 Id. 
6 This might be attempted, for instance, using Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1) or a state equivalent.  
That rule also has a requirement that the witness now be subject to cross-examination and there is a similar 
question about whether cross-examination of a now memory-impaired witness can satisfy the rule, but 
jurisdictions do on occasion hold that it does. 
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incident described in it.7  In determining whether such a witness could afford the defendant 
her confrontation rights, questions arise, such as should the right to confront simply mean 
the right to look one’s accuser in the eye at trial and pose questions on cross-examination, 
even if the witness lacks sufficient memory of the events to answer any such questions?  
Would a witness only meet the requirements of confrontation if she had capacity to answer 
all substantive questions posed?  Or, should the degree of the declarant’s memory 
impairment make a difference?8   
In this regard, two petitions denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
December 2019—White v. Louisiana and Tapia v. New York—could have permitted the 
Court to clarify the current state of confrontation rights in memory loss cases.9  In each, 
the prosecution sought to introduce a prior statement by a witness, the relevant witness 
appeared to testify at trial, but such witness suffered from memory loss.10  According to 
the petitioners in each case, the relevant memory-impaired witnesses were insufficient for 
purposes of the Confrontation Clause.11   
The purpose of this Article is to identify and discuss eight key issues arising in 
connection with memory impairment in Confrontation Clause witnesses.  Part II will offer 
background on the Confrontation Clause; Part III will present the recent certiorari petitions; 
Part IV will identify and discuss our eight key memory impairment issues; and Part V will 
conclude.   
 
II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE BACKGROUND 
 
 Prior to Crawford, the courts had been guided in Confrontation Clause cases by 
Ohio v. Roberts,12 pursuant to which admission of hearsay statements consistent with the 
Clause required the declarant’s unavailability coupled with sufficient “indicia of 
reliability.”13  Crawford and its progeny altered the paradigm, finding that only so-called 
“testimonial” statements would trigger the protections of the Confrontation Clause.14   
 
                                                 
7 A similar issue could arise, for instance, where an individual lost their memory after direct examination at 
trial but before cross-examination.  This Article generally utilizes hypotheticals focused on introduction of 
a prior statement through a memory-impaired witness; however, we suspect that any rule set by the Court 
would apply equally to other contexts, such as memory loss after direct examination but prior to cross-
examination. 
8 Some degree of guidance may be drawn from a pre-Crawford line of cases on this issue culminating in 
U.S. v. Owens.  See U.S. v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988).  However, as will be discussed in more detail 
below, such line of cases did not answer all relevant questions and it is unclear the extent to which such 
precedent maintains vitality after Crawford. 
9 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, White v. Louisiana, No. 18-8862 (Apr. 11, 2019); Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Tapia v. New York, No. 19-159 (July 31, 2019); White v. Louisiana, No. 18-8862, ___ S. Ct. 
___, 2019 WL 6689875 (2019) (Mem); Tapia v. New York, No. 19-159, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2019 WL 6689666 
(2019) (Mem). 
10 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, White, supra note 9; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tapia, supra note 9.  
There are, of course, distinctions between the situations in these two petitions and the facts of each will be 
discussed in more detail below.  See infra, Part III.  
11 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, White, supra note 9; Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tapia, supra note 9. 
12 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
13 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.  Where evidence fell within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception [,]” reliability 
could be inferred.  Id. 
14 Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
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A. Crawford & Testimonial Statements 
 
In Crawford, the prosecution sought to offer tape-recorded statements of the 
defendant’s wife against the defendant.15  The wife’s statements had been made to the 
police, but the defendant was not afforded an opportunity for cross-examination.16  
Notwithstanding the defendant’s argument that admitting the statements would violate his 
confrontation rights, the prosecution was permitted to play the statements for the jury.17  
The defendant was convicted and the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari.18 
In an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court found that admission 
of the taped testimony violated the defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights.19  After 
reviewing the common law history of the confrontation right and the text of the 
Confrontation Clause, the Court determined that the Clause ensured a procedural right to 
cross-examination and was directed at those who “bear testimony.”20  An accuser who 
made a formal statement to a government officer would “bear testimony” in a way that an 
individual making a casual remark to one of her acquaintances would not.21  Accordingly, 
there existed a core class of out-of-court “testimonial” statements with which the Clause 
was concerned, and admission of these testimonial statements against a criminal defendant 
without the opportunity for cross-examination at trial would violate the Confrontation 
Clause (absent the declarant’s unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant).22  The Court did not comprehensively define testimonial, but noted that the term 
at least applied to prior testimony at a former trial, before a grand jury, or at a preliminary 
hearing, as well as to police interrogations.23 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, wrote a concurring opinion 
to denounce the Court’s overruling of Roberts,24 even though he believed the Court’s result 
was supported by Roberts and its progeny.25  According to the Chief Justice, the Courts 
new interpretation of the Clause was unnecessary, not supported by sufficiently persuasive 
reasoning, and would “cast[] a mantle of uncertainty over future criminal trials [.]”26  He 
argued that neither the Supreme Court—nor any other court of which he was aware—had 
                                                 
15 Id. at 38. 
16 Id. at 38-40.  The wife was not able to testify at trial due to state marital privilege.  Id. 
17 Id. at 38-41. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 68-69. 
20 Id. at 42-61.  Testimony, according to the Court, would typically be a “solemn declaration 
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.”  Id. at 51. 
21 Id. at 51. 
22 Id. at 42-68. 
23 Id. at 68.  In coming to its conclusion, the Court also discussed various formulations of the class of 
testimonial statements that had existed: (i) “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, 
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-
examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,” 
(ii) “extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, 
depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,” and (iii) “statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use 
at a later trial [.]”  Id. at 51-52.   
24 Id. at 69. 
25 Id. at 76. 
26 Id. at 69. 
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ever drawn a distinction between nontestimonial and testimonial statements, and he saw 
“little value in trading our precedent for an imprecise approximation at this late date.”27 
It is worth noting that, in footnote 9, Justice Scalia reiterated the following in 
response to the Chief Justice’s criticisms: 
  
[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the 
Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior 
testimonial statements. . . . It is therefore irrelevant that the reliability of 
some out-of-court statements cannot be replicated, even if the declarant 
testifies to the same matters in court. . . . The Clause does not bar admission 
of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain 
it.28  
 
Following Crawford, courts were left with the task of determining when a given 
statement would be considered testimonial.  The Supreme Court has come to rely on an 
objective primary purpose analysis in making such determination.  
 
B. Objective Primary Purpose 
 
 The Court has found that a statement will be considered testimonial when its 
objective primary purpose is to create an out-of-court substitute for in-court trial testimony, 
but such statement would be deemed non-testimonial if made for some other purpose.29  
The Court developed and refined its analysis in Davis v. Washington30 and Michigan v. 
Bryant.31 
 Davis required the Court to decide when statements directed to law enforcement 
personnel at the scene of a crime or on a 911 call would be testimonial.32  Davis was 
actually a consolidated appeal of the lower court domestic disturbance cases State v. 
Davis33 and Hammon v. State.34  In the former, the state sought to enter statements made 
by an alleged victim to a 911 operator prior to police reaching the scene,35 and in the latter, 
the state sought to use an alleged victim’s statements made to the police after officers had 
reached the scene and during a time when the accused appeared to be under control.36  
Neither alleged victim testified at trial.37  In rendering its decision, the Court carved out an 
                                                 
27 Id. at 72. 
28 Id. at 59 n. 9 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
29 See generally Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011).  Put differently, a statement would be 
testimonial where its objective primary purpose is “to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution.”  Id. at 356-75. 
30 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
31 562 U.S. 344. 
32 Davis, 547 U.S. at 817. 
33 111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005). 
34 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005). 
35 547 U.S. at 817-18. 
36 Id. at 818-21.  The Court noted that the accused was in the kitchen around the time the police entered the 
house, he spoke with the police, and one officer remained with the accused while the other spoke with the 
alleged victim.  Id. at 819-20.   
37 Id. at 819-20.  
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“emergency” exception to testimonial hearsay which relied on the statement’s primary 
purpose: 
 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.38 
 
As such, the Court determined that the statements in State v. Davis made prior to police 
arrival would be nontestimonial, but the statements in Hammon would be testimonial.39 
In Bryant, which built upon Davis, the accused was convicted of second-degree 
murder after the prosecution successfully entered statements made by the mortally 
wounded alleged victim to the police in the parking lot of a gas station.40  The alleged 
victim died within hours after leaving the gas station, and the police left the gas station to 
search for the accused.41  Bryant was different that Davis in that it, among other things, 
involved a fatal gunshot wound, an alleged victim found in a public location, and an 
accused whose location was not known at the time when the police found the alleged 
victim.42  Clarifying and refining its opinion in Davis, the Supreme Court found that an 
“ongoing emergency” may be one example of a situation where the primary purpose of a 
statement was not to create a trial record, but it was not the only example: 
 
When, as in Davis, the primary purpose of an interrogation is to respond to 
an “ongoing emergency,” its purpose is not to create a record for trial and 
thus is not within the scope of the Clause. But there may be other 
circumstances, aside from ongoing emergencies, when a statement is not 
procured with a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for 
trial testimony. . . . Where no such primary purpose exists, the admissibility 
of a statement is the concern of state and federal rules of evidence, not the 
Confrontation Clause.43 
 
In assessing the primary purpose, the Court noted that “[a]n objective analysis of 
the circumstances of an encounter and the statements and actions of the parties to 
                                                 
38 Id. at 822. 
39 Id. at 827-31.  Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part to register his 
disapproval of the Court’s primary purpose test, noting it was both difficult to apply and “characterize[d] 
as ‘testimonial,’ and therefore inadmissible, evidence that bears little resemblance to what we have 
recognized as the evidence targeted by the Confrontation Clause.”  Id. at 834. 
40 562 U.S. at 348. 
41 Id. at 349-50. 
42 Id. at 359. 
43 Id. at 358-59. 
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it” provided the best assessment.44  Applying the primary purpose analysis to the 
facts, the Court determined that the statements in Bryant were nontestimonial.45 
 
C. Memory Loss Precedent? 
 
Since the present Article focuses on memory loss in the context of the 
Confrontation Clause, a discussion of the Court’s opinions in California v. Green46 
Delaware v. Fensterer,47 and U.S. v. Owens48 may also prove instructive.  It is important 
to note that these cases were decided before Crawford, and so there is a question as to 
whether their logic would still govern the Court’s analysis.49   
Green concerned a charge of “furnishing marijuana to a minor” against John 
Anthony Green.50  The alleged minor, Melvin Porter, had been arrested in connection with 
selling drugs and had named Green as his supplier.51  As recounted later by Officer Wade, 
Porter had said that Green had phoned him earlier in the month “asked him to sell some 
‘stuff’ or ‘grass,’” and “personally delivered a shopping bag containing 29 ‘baggies' of 
marihuana.”52  Porter made a sale to an undercover officer from this supply.53  One week 
later, Porter gave testimony at Green’s preliminary hearing, naming Green as his supplier, 
but now asserting that Green showed Porter where he could pick up the bag of drugs at 
Green’s parents’ house.54  Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony was subject to “extensive 
cross-examination” by Green’s counsel.55   
Approximately two months later, at trial, Porter took the stand and was 
“uncooperative” and “markedly evasive [.]”56  In particular, Porter claimed he was not 
certain how he had obtained the drugs, primarily due to the LSD he had taken twenty 
minutes prior to Green calling.57  He claimed he was not able to recall events following the 
call, and that the LSD prevented him from distinguishing fantasy from fact.58  Parts of 
Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony were read by the prosecutor, and such evidence was 
admitted for its truth.59  With Porter’s recollection “refreshed” due to the preliminary 
                                                 
44 Id. at 360. 
45 Id. at 375-78.  Justice Thomas again criticized the Court’s primary purpose analysis in a concurring 
opinion in Bryant.  Id. at 378-379.  Justices Scalia and Ginsburg both wrote dissenting opinions to criticize 
the Court’s opinion, with Justice Scalia charging that it “distorts our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
and leaves it in a shambles.”  Id. at 379-96. 
46 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
47 474 U.S. 15 (1985). 
48 484 U.S. 554. 
49 It is noteworthy that Justice Scalia, who authored the Court’s opinion in Crawford and is perhaps its 
fiercest defender, also authored the Court’s opinions in Owens.  See generally Owens, 484 U.S. 554.  The 
Owens Court relied upon Fensterer, and Green was cited by Justice Scalia in Crawford.  See Owens, 484 
U.S. at 558-60; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57, 59 n. 9. 
50 Green, 399 U.S. at 151. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 151-52. 
57 Id. at 152. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
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hearing testimony, Porter “guessed” he obtained the drugs from behind Green’s parents’ 
home and had given Green the money from the sale.60  On cross, Porter indicated it was 
his recollection of the preliminary hearing testimony which was “mostly” refreshed, rather 
than of the events themselves.61  Officer Wade later took the stand, and recounted Porter’s 
earlier statement that Green delivered him the drugs, and such statement was admitted as 
substantive evidence.62  Porter stated he had told the truth, as he then believed it to be, both 
at the preliminary hearing and to Officer Wade.63  Porter also insisted he was telling the 
truth at the trial in respect of his inability to recall the actual events.64  Green was convicted, 
and the U.S. Supreme Court eventually agreed to hear the case.65 
Justice White, writing for the Court, first focused on admission of the preliminary 
hearing testimony.66  The Court found that the Confrontation Clause did not require 
exclusion of a witness’s prior statements where the witness admitted making such 
statements and where the witness might be asked to explain or defend the inconsistency 
between a prior and present version of the relevant events, thereby opening the witness to 
“full cross-examination” as to both stories.67  The Court then turned to admission of 
Porter’s statements to Officer Wade.68  Justice White noted that, in the typical case to which 
the lower court had addressed itself, the trial witness offers a different version of events 
from that given on the prior occasion.69  In such instance, the opportunity to cross-examine 
the witness at trial is adequate for purposes of the Confrontation Clause to make admissible 
both “the casual, off-hand remark to a stranger, and the carefully recorded testimony at a 
prior hearing.”70  However, the Court noted that in the present case, Porter claimed he could 
not recall the events occurring after Green telephoned him and so Porter failed to provide 
any current version of more important events set out in the earlier statement.71  Justice 
White did not reach the question of whether Porter’s purported loss of memory so affected 
Green’s cross-examination right as to make a Confrontation Clause difference, since that 
issue was not yet ripe.72   
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 153.  
66 Id. at 155-64.  Neither Justice Marshall nor Justice Blackmun took part in the decision, and Justice 
Blackmun also did not take part in consideration of the case.  Id. at 170. 
67 Id. at 164.  The Court noted that “[v]iewed historically . . . there is good reason to conclude that the 
Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements, as long as the 
declarant is testifying as a witness and subject to full and effective cross-examination.”  Id. at 164.  The 
Court also argued that it believed admission of Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony would not have 
violated the Confrontation Clause had Porter been unavailable, and so a different result should not be 
reached when Porter was actually produced.  Id. at 165. 
68 Id. at 168. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 168-69.  The Court noted that the state court had not focused on that issue, nor did either party 
address itself to such question.  Id. at 169.  The Court also pointed out, for instance, that since it had held 
“that the admission of Porter’s preliminary hearing testimony is not barred by the Sixth Amendment despite 
his apparent lapse of memory, the reception into evidence of the Porter statement to Officer Wade may 
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Chief Justice Burger wrote a concurring opinion to emphasize the value of state-
level experimentation, and Justice Harlan also authored a concurring opinion to discuss, 
among other things, the need to take a “fresh look” at the concept of confrontation.73  In 
his concurrence, Justice Harlan stated: 
 
The fact that the witness, though physically available, cannot recall either 
the underlying events that are the subject of an extra-judicial statement or 
previous testimony or recollect the circumstances under which the 
statement was given, does not have Sixth Amendment consequence.  The 
prosecution has no less fulfilled its obligation simply because a witness has 
a lapse of memory.  The witness is, in my view, available.  To the extent 
that the witness is, in a practical sense, unavailable for cross-examination 
on the relevant facts, . . . I think confrontation is nonetheless 
satisfied.74 
 
Justice Brennan dissented, arguing that the case raised two issues: (i) whether the 
Confrontation Clause permitted the extrajudicial statements of a witness to be admitted as 
substantive evidence when the witness claimed the inability to recall the events with which 
her statement dealt; and (ii) whether the Confrontation Clause allowed the prior hearing 
statement of a witness—made subject to cross-examination and under oath—to be used as 
substantive evidence where the witness claimed the inability to recall the events with which 
her statement dealt.75  Justice Brennan’s view was that neither statement could be 
introduced without unconstitutionally restricting the accused’s right to challenge 
incriminating evidence before the factfinder.76 
Fifteen years after Green, in Fensterer, the Court had the opportunity to consider 
whether admitting opinion testimony from the prosecution’s expert—who could not recall 
the basis for the opinion—violated the Confrontation Clause.77  William Fensterer had been 
convicted for murdering his fiancée.78  In order to prove that two hairs found on the alleged 
murder weapon were the victim’s, and that one of such hairs had been removed forcibly, 
the state relied upon testimony from an FBI Special Agent.79  At trial, the Special Agent 
testified to one of the hairs having been forcibly removed, and explained there were three 
theories for determining this.80  However, he testified that, after having reviewed his notes, 
he had “no specific knowledge as to the particular way that [he] determined the hair was 
forcibly removed other than the fact that one of those hairs was forcibly removed.”81  On 
cross-examination, the Special Agent was again unable to remember which method he 
                                                 
pose a harmless-error question which is more appropriately resolved by the California courts in the first 
instance.”  Id. at 170. 
73 Id. at 171-73. 
74 Id. at 188-89. 
75 Id. at 189-91. 
76 Id. at 191. 
77 Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 16. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 17. 
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used.82  The trial court overruled Fensterer’s objection that the Special Agent’s testimony 
precluded sufficient cross-examination, explaining that such objection went to weight 
rather than admissibility.83  The Delaware Supreme Court reversed on the basis of the 
Confrontation Clause, noting among other things, that “[e]ffective cross-examination and 
discrediting of [the Special Agent’s] opinion at a minimum required that he commit himself 
to the basis of his opinion.”84 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Delaware Supreme Court, finding no 
Confrontation Clause violation.85  The Court stated that, in general, the Confrontation 
Clause guaranteed “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination 
that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”86  As 
the Court noted: 
 
The Confrontation Clause includes no guarantee that every witness called 
by the prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is marred by 
forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion.  To the contrary, the Confrontation 
Clause is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair 
opportunity to probe and expose these infirmities through cross-
examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for 
giving scant weight to the witness’ testimony.87 
   
The Court pointed out that cross-examination of the Special Agent’s testimony 
revealed to the jury that the Special Agent could not even remember the theory forming 
the basis of his opinion, and the defense’s expert was able to suggest the Special Agent’s 
theory was unreliable.88  According to the Court, the Confrontation Clause required no 
more than that.89  However, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that memory loss 
could theoretically form the basis of a Confrontation Clause violation: 
 
We need not decide whether there are circumstances in which a witness’ 
lapse of memory may so frustrate any opportunity for cross-examination 
                                                 
82 Id.  The defense’s expert also attacked the Special Agent’s theory on forcible removal as the defense 
expert understood it to be.  Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 18.  
85 Id.  It was a per curiam decision, in which Justice Marshall dissented from the summary disposition, 
Justice Blackmun would have granted certiorari, and Justice Stevens “reluctantly concur[red]” and pointed 
out that he thought Fensterer should not have been decided without full argument.  Id. at 23-24. 
86 Id. at 20.  That conclusion, the Court found, was “confirmed by the fact that the assurances of reliability 
our cases have found in the right of cross-examination are fully satisfied in cases such as this one, 
notwithstanding the witness’ inability to recall the basis for his opinion: the factfinder can observe the 
witness’ demeanor under cross-examination, and the witness is testifying under oath and in the presence of 
the accused.”  Id. 
87 Id. at 21-22.  
88 Id. at 20. 
89 Id. 
 10
that admission of the witness’ direct testimony violates the Confrontation 
Clause.90  
 
A few years later, Owens required the Court to consider whether the Confrontation 
Clause barred testimony regarding a previous, out-of-court identification when the witness 
making the identification could not explain the basis for such identification due to memory 
loss.91  A correctional counselor at a prison, John Foster, had been beaten and he suffered 
a skull fracture and was hospitalized for nearly a month.92  When interviewed by an FBI 
Agent approximately a week after the incident, Foster seemed lethargic and was unable to 
remember the name of his attacker.93  A little over two weeks later, on May 5, the FBI 
Agent again spoke with Foster, and this time Foster seemed much improved.94  He was 
able to describe the attack, name the accused as his attacker, and identify the accused from 
a set of photographs.95 
At trial, Foster testified to his activities just prior to the attack, recounted seeing 
blood on the floor and feeling blows to his head, and that he remembered identifying the 
accused as his attacker during his FBI interview on May 5, 1982.96  On cross-examination, 
Foster conceded that he could not remember: (i) seeing his attacker; (ii) any visitors he 
received in the hospital aside from the FBI Agent, even though evidence suggested there 
were numerous such visitors; and (iii) whether any of the visitors he received had suggested 
the accused was the attacker.97  The defense unsuccessfully attempted to refresh Foster’s 
recollection using hospital records, including one record which indicated Foster had 
attributed the attack to someone other than the accused.98  The accused was convicted and 
the Supreme Court eventually granted certiorari.99 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, found that the Confrontation Clause was not 
violated.100  He began by recognizing that the Court had never determined that a violation 
of the Confrontation Clause could be founded upon the memory loss of a witness.101  After 
considering past precedent, Justice Scalia stated that the Confrontation Clause only 
guaranteed “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is 
effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”102  He argued 
                                                 
90 Id.  In that connection, the Court declined to decide the question raised by Green, but not decided by it: 
“[w]hether [the witness’s] apparent lapse of memory so affected [the accused’s] right to cross-examine as 
to make a critical difference in the application of the Confrontation Clause [.]”  Id. at 21. 
91 Owens, 484 U.S. at 555-56. 
92 Id. at 556.  Justice Kennedy did not take part in the decision or in consideration of the case.  Id. 
93 Id.  
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 556-557. 
100 Id. at 564. 
101 Id. at 557. 
102 Id. at 558-59 (emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted).  It is also noteworthy that, in 
the context of discussing cross-examination under the Federal Rules of Evidence, Justice Scalia stated: 
“Ordinarily a witness is regarded as ‘subject to cross-examination’ when he is placed on the stand, under 
oath, and responds willingly to questions.  Just as with the constitutional prohibition, limitations on the 
scope of examination by the trial court or assertions of privilege by the witness may undermine the process 
to such a degree that meaningful cross-examination within the intent of the Rule no longer exists.  But that 
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that this “opportunity” was not denied where a witness testified to a current belief but was 
not able to recall the reason for such belief.103  It would be sufficient, the Court found, that 
a defendant was entitled to make the jury aware through cross-examination of witness bias, 
lack of attentiveness or care, poor eyesight, and poor memory.104  Justice Scalia argued that 
if the ability to inquire about these matters was a sufficient cross-examination opportunity 
as to a current belief (the basis for which the witness could not recall), the Court saw no 
reason why it should be an insufficient opportunity in connection with a past belief (the 
basis of which the witness could not recall).105  In either case, the belief’s foundation could 
not effectively be elicited, but there were other means of impugning the belief.106  Justice 
Scalia found that “memory-testing” was not required in the latter case, as the Court had 
previously found in connection with the former case.107  Although the means of impugning 
a witness who asserted memory loss would not always be effective, the Constitution did 
not guarantee success.108 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented from the Court’s opinion.109  
Justice Brennan argued that if Foster had died from his injuries, there would be no doubt 
that the Confrontation Clause would have barred the FBI Agent from recounting Foster’s 
identification of the accused, and Foster’s profound memory loss rendered him no less a 
conduit for inscrutable and stale evidence than the FBI Agent would have been.110  In 
Justice Brennan’s view, the Court’s opinion reduced the confrontation right to a “markedly 
hollow” purely procedural protection, and he believed criminal defendants were guaranteed 
a right to cross-examination “sufficient to afford the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for 
evaluating the truth of a prior statement [.]”111  According to Justice Brennan, the accused’s 
real “accuser” was the Foster from May 5, not the Foster on the stand.112  He pointed to 
past Court precedent suggesting that the right to confront ensures “an opportunity for 
effective cross-examintion [.]”113  Justice Brennan believed the Confrontation Clause 
guaranteed “more than the right to ask questions of a live witness, no matter how dead that 
                                                 
effect is not produced by the witness’ assertion of memory loss—which, as discussed earlier, is often the 
very result sought to be produced by cross-examination, and can be effective in destroying the force of 
the prior statement.”  Id. at 561-62.  
103 Id. at 559. 
104 Id.  Justice Scalia suggested that showing that a witness has a bad memory “is often a prime objective of 
cross-examination [.]”  Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id.  Justice Scalia continued: “if there is any difference in persuasive impact between the statement ‘I 
believe this to be the man who assaulted me, but can’t remember why’ and the statement ‘I don’t know 
whether this is the man who assaulted me, but I told the police I believed so earlier,’ the former would 
seem, if anything, more damaging and hence give rise to a greater need for memory-testing, if that is to be 
considered essential to an opportunity for effective cross-examination.”  Id. 
107 Id. at 559-60. 
108 Id. at 560.  Justice Scalia also pointed out that the defense does have realistic weapons, as demonstrated 
by defense counsel’s Owens summation, in which defense counsel emphasized Foster’s memory loss and 
argued that Foster’s identification of the accused resulted from suggestions provided by hospital visitors 
Forster received.  Id.  
109 Id. at 564. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 565 (internal quotation marks and brackets removed). 
112 Id. at 566. 
113 Id. at 565-67 (emphasis in original). 
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witness’ memory proves to be [,]” and he would have found a Confrontation Clause 
violation.114 
Owens remains the leading Supreme Court case on memory impairment in the 
context of the Confrontation Clause, but Owens leaves many issues unresolved.  In 
particular, even assuming Owens survives Crawford, it is unclear whether Owens would 
govern the Court’s analysis in a case where the witness has an arguably lesser degree of 
recollection than the witness in Owens.115  It is this issue which was raised by two recent 
certiorari petitions, and we turn to these petitions in the next Part. 
 
III.  THE RECENT SUPREME COURT PETITIONS 
 
The certiorari petitions in White v. Louisiana and Tapia v. New York were 
considered by the Supreme Court in December 2019.  Both afforded the Court an 
opportunity to clarify confrontation rights in memory loss cases. 
In White, a defendant, Roderick White, had been convicted of second degree 
murder.116  Brandon Coleman was driving around with three passengers, one of whom was 
White.117  Nearby, Gregory Spears was selling compact disks out of his car, and NaQuian 
Robinson drove by, got out, and purchased some disks from Spears.118  As Spears and 
Robinson stood talking, Coleman stopped at a carwash nearby.119  White exited the car, 
walked over to Spears and Robinson, and asked Spears about some disks.120  Spears turned 
to look in the trunk, and White pulled out a gun and attempted to rob Robinson.121  
Robinson and White wrestled over the gun and Robinson was shot several times.122  White 
ran down the road and was eventually picked up and driven away by Coleman.123   
After getting into his car and driving a short distance, Robinson crashed into a 
fence.124  Robinson’s family brought him to the hospital, where he died the same day from 
his wounds.125  Spears was not able to identify the shooter.126  The police brought Coleman 
in for questioning, and Coleman implicated White in the shooting.127   
                                                 
114 Id. at 565-67, 572. 
115 Importantly, the Court did not face the situation in Green, Fensterer, or Owens where a witness 
completely forgot the criminal incident and her statements to law enforcement about it.  We will discuss 
this issue further in Part IV.  
116 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix at 2, White v. Louisiana, No. 18-8862 (Apr. 11, 2019).  In the 
absence of full Supreme Court opinions in White and Tapia, the facts of these cases are derived from the 
lower court rulings, rather than from any assertions of the parties in their petition-related briefings. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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White did not testify at the trial,128 but Coleman did.129  The prosecutor noted that 
Coleman had “had a fall” and “may or may not have some issues with memory.”130  During 
the direct examination, Coleman knew his birth date and age, but testified to having had 
some memory issues which began around September of the prior year.131  He testified that 
he could not recall anything about the incident in which Robinson was shot, nor could he 
recall talking to the police regarding the shooting.132  Coleman was able to identify himself 
when the prosecutor played a snippet of his videotaped statement.133  Over defense 
counsel’s Confrontation Clause objection, Coleman’s videotaped statement was played.134  
On cross-examination, Coleman testified that he could not recall speaking with his father 
(who was in the videotaped statement), could not recall any event on the day of the 
shooting, and stated “[a]fter September, I don’t remember nothing.”135  
White argued on appeal, that the trial court had erred in permitting the jury to hear 
Coleman’s videotaped statement to the police.136  More specifically, White contended that 
Coleman’s failure to recall at trial the events surrounding Robinson’s shooting or the giving 
of Coleman’s videotaped statement violated White’s right to confrontation, since Coleman 
could not be effectively or meaningfully cross-examined about the statement.137 
The Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit considered, among other things, 
Owens and footnote 9 in Crawford, and determined that the trial court had not erred in 
entering Coleman’s statement into evidence.138  As the court said, “a declarant’s 
appearance and subjection to cross examination at trial are all that is necessary to satisfy 
the right to confrontation, even if the declarant suffers from memory loss.”139 
On January 14, 2019, the Louisiana Supreme Court denied certiorari.140  On April 
11, 2019, White filed a certiorari petition to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing among other 
things, that: (i) the Louisiana Supreme Court had wrongly decided the case; (ii) lower 
courts were in conflict as to the application of Owens to cases of “complete” memory 
loss141 and as to whether Owens could be reconciled with Crawford in “genuine” memory 
                                                 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 3. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 3-4. 
133 Id. at 4. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 2. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 5-7 (“In footnote nine of its opinion, the Crawford court stated that ‘when the declarant appears 
for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior 
testimonial statements.’ . . . It further stated, ‘[t]he Clause does not bar admission of a statement as long as 
the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.’”) (citations omitted).  
139 Id. at 5-6. 
140 Id. at 8.  There was an opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari, but it was primarily targeted at 
considerations in the Louisiana Constitution, specifically “whether the Louisiana Constitution requires 
greater safeguards than the Sixth Amendment.”  Id. at 9-11. 
141 The petition argues that “[t]hree categories of memory loss are relevant to determining a witness’ 
availability for confrontation and therefore the admissibility of that witness’ hearsay.  A witness may 
remember the incident but not remember a subsequent statement about it.  The witness may not remember 
the incident itself but be able to remember a statement about it.  Or, as in this case, the witness may not 
remember the incident or the statement.  The first two categories are fairly termed partial memory loss, 
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loss cases; and (iii) federal and state courts were opposed in result in genuine memory loss 
cases.142   
In particular, the White certiorari petition sought to draw a distinction between three 
categories of memory loss: (i) the witness recalled the incident but not the statement about 
it; (ii) the witness recalled the statement but not the incident; and (iii) the witness recalled 
neither the statement nor the incident.143  The petition termed the third type of memory loss 
“compete” memory loss and the first two types “partial” memory loss.144  White asserted 
that Owens only concerned partial memory loss—in that the relevant witness recalled the 
statement but not the incident.145  The petition then argued that, prior to White, the Court 
had never squarely faced a case of complete memory loss.146  
 In Tapia, filed some months after White, a Sergeant Charlie Bello had testified that 
he had been driving Lieutenant James Cosgrove when Bello saw the defendant “body slam” 
the alleged victim and drag the victim between parked cars.147  Bello testified that after 
separating the victim from the defendant, he noticed that the victim was “bleeding 
profusely from his face and neck.”148  He observed a shattered beer bottle, and the victim 
had sustained several injuries consistent with having been cut with a dangerous 
instrument.149  The victim also testified to having been attacked from behind and identified 
the defendant as one of the attackers.150 
 The prosecution produced Cosgrove to testify, but he could not independently recall 
the incident.151  When the prosecution sought to introduce Cosgrove’s prior grand jury 
testimony as a “past recollection recorded [,]” the defense objected on the basis of the 
Confrontation Clause, arguing that Cosgrove’s memory loss meant he could not be cross-
examined.152 
 On the stand, Cosgrove testified to having worked the shift with Bello, and based 
on a review of paperwork, he was able to testify to assisting in the arrest of two 
individuals.153  He was unable to recall the circumstances which led to the defendant’s 
arrest.154  Cosgrove also provided testimony to support admission of his prior grand jury 
testimony, including that the prior testimony failed to refresh his current recollection of 
events.155 
                                                 
while the third constitutes complete or total memory loss.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, White, supra 
note 9, at 7.  The petition asserts that the witness in Owens “suffered from partial memory loss of the 
second kind; he did not remember the incident, but he did remember making the statement sought to be 
introduced.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
142 See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, White, supra note 9. 
143 Id. at 7. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 2-3, 7 (“At trial Coleman could recall neither (a) the crime itself nor (b) his statement to the 
police.”).  The petition also advanced the point that the state had failed to challenge the completeness or 
genuineness of Coleman’s memory loss.  Id. 
147 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix at 2, Tapia v. New York, No. 19-159. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 3. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. at 4. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
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 Cosgrove’s prior grand jury testimony—which was not particularly detailed and 
which contradicted Bello’s trial testimony—was read into the record.156  The grand jury 
testimony added that Cosgrove witnessed the defendant kick the victim.157  On cross-
examination, Cosgrove admitted, among other things, that he had been to the area of the 
attack on various occasions due to altercations there, could not recall details of such 
altercations, and could not swear the court reporter’s transcript of his grand jury testimony 
was accurate due to his lack of independent recollection.158  The jury found the defendant 
guilty, and the Appellate Division affirmed, based in part on their finding no Confrontation 
Clause violation.159 
 The New York Court of Appeals also affirmed the conviction.160  The New York 
Court of Appeals found unavailing defendant’s argument that, despite Cosgrove testifying 
at trial, his memory failure rendered Cosgrove unavailable for cross-examination for 
purposes of the Confrontation Clause.161  It stated that the right to confront includes both 
the right to cross-examine witnesses and to confront the accuser in a “face-to-face 
encounter before the trier of fact [.]”162  The court cited Owens as directly on point where 
a witness could not explain the basis for a past out-of-court statement because of memory 
loss,163 and stated that Crawford maintained the “fundamental importance of a witness’s 
presence at trial” even though it changed the landscape.164  Accordingly, the court held that 
Cosgrove’s presence at the trial as a witness where Cosgrove was subject to cross-
examination precluded the defendant’s Confrontation Clause argument.165 
 On July 31, 2019, the defendant (then petitioner), filed a certiorari petition to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.166  The petition argued, among other things, that the decision below 
was incorrect and that lower courts disagreed as to how the Confrontation Clause applied 
to prior testimonial statements where memory loss was involved.167  Similar to the petition 
in White, the Tapia petition argued that Owens only “involv[ed] partial (rather than total) 
memory loss” and that, unlike in Tapia, the defendant in Owens “could at least use the 
witness’s impaired memory to cast doubt on the reliability of his prior identification.”168  
                                                 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 5. 
159 Id. at 6. 
160 Id. at 7. 
161 Id. at 14. 
162 Id. (citations omitted). 
163 Id. 
164 Id. at 15.  The court also quoted the following text from footnote 9 in Crawford: “[W]hen the declarant 
appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his 
prior testimonial statements. . . . The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant 
is present at trial to defend or explain it [.]”  Id. 
165 Id.  The dissent did not really deal with the Confrontation Clause issue, but did raise questions about the 
applicability of Owens and the value of cross-examining a memory-impaired witness in the context of 
discussing a state criminal procedure law.  See generally id. (Wilson J., dissenting). 
166 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tapia, supra note 9, at 27. 
167 See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Tapia, supra note 9. 
168 Id. at 2, 19.  Although the Tapia petition uses the word “total” to describe the memory loss here, it 
elsewhere uses the word “complete” and so we assume it intends these terms to be interchangeable.  See id. 
at 1. 
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 On December 9, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in both White and 
Tapia.169  Although neither White nor Tapia squarely raised all the issues we believe need 
resolution in the memory loss area, the Court could arguable have used either petition as a 
vehicle for clarifying the law.170  If nothing else, that two such petitions were recently filed 
reflects the need for greater clarity.  In the next Part, we will identify and discuss eight 
issues we believe require resolution in this area.            
 
IV. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE & MEMORY LOSS 
 
There are at least eight important issues arising in the context of memory loss in 
Confrontation Clause witnesses.  We will discuss each of these issues in turn using 
illustrative hypotheticals.  For each hypothetical, we will assume that all relevant witness 
statements are testimonial, that the statements are otherwise admissible,171 and that the only 
potential basis for exclusion would be that the witnesses’ memory-impaired trial testimony 
is insufficient to meet the standards of the Confrontation Clause.172   
Prior to proceeding to our discussion of the issues, there are four assumptions we 
must set out in advance.  First, whatever we may think of Owens, we accept it as a given 
for purposes of our discussion.  We assume the Court would still consider Owens binding 
post-Crawford, in particular because Justice Scalia authored both opinions and would have 
likely anticipated that they could be interpreted consistently.173  Second, and flowing from 
our acceptance of Owens, we suspect that the logic underpinning any rule the Supreme 
Court may set on our eight issues would be what minimum opportunity for cross-
examination is sufficient under the circumstances to test witness credibility.174  Third, we 
                                                 
169 White v. Louisiana, No. 18-8862, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2019 WL 6689875 (2019) (Mem); Tapia v. New York, 
No. 19-159, ___ S. Ct. ___, 2019 WL 6689666 (2019) (Mem). 
170 Of the two petitions, we think White would have been the better vehicle. 
171 For instance, we will assume the prior out-of-court statements are admissible pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Evidence 801(d) or a state analogue. 
172 In our discussion of each issue, we also seek to focus on only the specific issue we are discussing.  As 
such, any facts or issues not presented should be treated as held constant.  For instance, when discussing the 
cause of the memory loss, we focus only on the cause and we control for other issues, such as whether or 
not the memory loss is genuine. 
173 See supra note 49.  That Green was cited in Crawford may further suggest that pre-Crawford memory 
loss cases such as Owens were intended to survive Crawford. 
174 See, e.g., Owens 484 U.S. at 559 (“[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for 
effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever 
extent, the defense might wish . . . that opportunity is not denied when a witness testifies as to his current 
belief but is unable to recollect the reason for that belief.  It is sufficient that the defendant has the 
opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness’ bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor 
eyesight, and even []what is often a prime objective of cross-examination, . . . the very fact that he has a 
bad memory.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  Albeit outside the memory loss context, 
the Supreme Court has been deeply divided recently on what degree of cross-examination is required to 
meet the Confrontation Clause.  See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (2012); see also Stuart v. 
Alabama, 139 S. Ct. 36 (2018) (Mem) (Gorsuch J., dissenting); Ronald J. Coleman & Paul F. Rothstein, 
Grabbing the Bullcoming by the Horns: How the Supreme Court Could Have Used Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico to Clarify Confrontation Clause Requirements for CSI-Type Reports, 90 NEB. L. REV. 502, 546 
(2011) [hereinafter Grabbing the Bullcoming]; Paul F. Rothstein, Unwrapping the Box the Supreme Court 
Justices Have Gotten Themselves Into: Internal Confrontations over Confronting the Confrontation 
Clause, 58 HOW. L.J. 479 (2015); A Game of Katso and Mouse, supra note 3.  We suspect the Court will 
also be divided in connection with memory loss. 
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believe that the Court would prefer to set a bright-line rule rather than to adopt a case-by-
case approach, and we take that as a given for purposes of our discussion.  We believe the 
Court would prefer a bright-line approach due to its statements in Crawford attacking the 
subjectivity of the Roberts reliability approach.175  Finally, because we anticipate that a 
bright-line approach would be the Court’s preference, we are generally focused in our 
discussion on witnesses completely forgetting the criminal incident and/or their statements 
to law enforcement, rather than merely forgetting certain details.  Although it would be an 
interesting exercise to consider whether recollection of certain types of details—or a certain 
number of details—provide an optimal level of credibility testing, we believe a test based 
on such fine distinctions would lead to the very type of discretionary case-by-case 
determination the Court would likely disfavor.  With those assumptions set, we proceed to 
discuss the eight issues. 
 
A. Partial or Complete Memory Loss 
 
Alison, Bobby, and Caitlin are states’ witnesses in three separate battery trials.  
They had each previously provided statements to the police, and they each now suffer from 
some degree of memory loss.  Alison recalls the incident but can no longer recall making 
her statements to the police.  Bobby can remember making his statements to the police but 
can no longer remember the incident.  Caitlin can recall neither the incident nor her 
statements to the police.  Each witness willingly takes the stand, but their direct and cross-
examination is limited due to their memory impairments.  The prosecution in each case 
seeks to enter each witness’s prior statements to the police, and the defense raises an 
objection pursuant to the Confrontation Clause.  Should Alison, Bobby, and Caitlin’s prior 
statements be excluded? 
As an initial matter, one might refer to witnesses like Alison and Bobby—who 
recall either the incident or their statements—as suffering from only “partial” memory loss, 
and witnesses like Caitlin—who can recall neither the incident nor their statements—as 
suffering from “complete” memory loss.176  It is noteworthy that the witness in Owens fell 
into the former category—in that he could recall making the identification of his assailant 
                                                 
175 See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-65 (“Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept.  
There are countless factors bearing on whether a statement is reliable [.]”).  We recognize that the primary 
purpose test utilized in the Confrontation Clause context incorporates some degree of subjectivity, but that 
test has been accordingly criticized.  See, e.g., Davis, 547 U.S. at 834 (“Today, a mere two years after the 
Court decided Crawford, it adopts an equally unpredictable test, under which district courts are charged 
with divining the ‘primary purpose’ of police interrogations.”) (Thomas J., concurring); Bryant, 562 U.S. at 
378-79 (“I have criticized the primary-purpose test as ‘an exercise in fiction’ that is ‘disconnected from 
history’ and ‘yields no predictable results.’”) (citation omitted) (Thomas J., concurring); Id. at 383 (“The 
only virtue of the Court’s approach (if it can be misnamned a virtue) is that it leaves judges free to reach the 
‘fairest’ result under the totality of the circumstances.”) (Scalia J., dissenting).  A case-by-case approach 
could also make it difficult for criminal defendants to prepare their defenses.  Specifically, depending on 
the subjectivity of the approach, defense attorneys may not be able to adequately advise defendants as to 
which evidence would be deemed admissible in any given case.  
176 We borrow this “partial” and “complete” memory loss terminology from the certiorari petition in White.  
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, White, supra note 9, at 7. 
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but not seeing his assailant—and so Owens did not directly speak to complete memory 
loss.177   
In resolving the Alison-Bobby-Caitlin hypothetical, then, there are several 
approaches the Court could theoretically take.  First, the Court could extend Owens, and 
simply find that memory loss of any form fails to raise a confrontation issue.  We will refer 
to this as the “Owens-Plus” approach.  We call this the Owens-Plus approach to denote that 
Owens, itself, did not foreclose the possibility that complete memory loss could render a 
witness insufficient for Confrontation Clause purposes.  Under such an approach, the 
statements of Alison (recalls incident not statements), Bobby (recalls statements not 
incident), and Caitlin (recalls neither incident nor statements) would all be entered.  
Second, the Court could decide that Owens does not survive Crawford, and that a witness 
who cannot recall the incident or statements is now procedurally insufficient for the 
Confrontation Clause.  Owens was decided pursuant to the Roberts regime, which had 
focused on “reliability [.]”178  Crawford recognized that the Confrontation Clause’s 
“ultimate goal” was to “ensure reliability of evidence,” but stated that it required “that 
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”179  The primacy Crawford placed on testing through cross-examination 
could cause the current Court to no longer feel bound by Owens.180  Under an approach 
where Owens no longer governed, it is at least possible that none of Alison, Bobby, or 
Caitlin’s statements might be admitted.   Finally, the Court could opt for a middle approach, 
pursuant to which recollection of the criminal incident and/or the statements to law 
enforcement were sufficient for Confrontation Clause purposes.181  We will refer to this as 
the “Middle” approach.182  Under such an approach the Court might conclude, for instance, 
                                                 
177 Owens, 484 U.S. at 556 (“At trial, Foster recounted his activities just before the attack, and described 
feeling the blows to his head and seeing blood on the floor.  He testified that he clearly remembered 
identifying respondent as his assailant during his May 5th interview with Mansfield.  On cross-
examination, he admitted that he could not remember seeing his assailant.”); see also Motion for Leave to 
File Amicus Curiae Brief and Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9-10, White v. Louisiana, No. 18-8862 (May 9, 2019) [hereinafter 
NACDL Brief].  There is, of course, an important distinction between a witness who recalls only the 
incident and one who recalls only the statement, and we will address this issue further below. 
178 Owens, 484 U.S. 554; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (“In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable.  
Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability.’  Reliability can be 
inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”). 
179 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (finding that the Confrontation Clause provided “a procedural rather than a 
substantive guarantee.”). 
180 Perhaps the Court could feel that, if Owens had arisen after Crawford, it might have been decided 
differently. 
181 Recall that, because we believe a bright-line approach would be the Court’s preference, we are focused 
here on a witness completely forgetting the incident or their statements.  We do not consider approaches 
which, for instance, would require lower courts to consider which specific details or how many details 
would be sufficient in a given case.  If the Court were to take an approach focused on, for instance, 
recalling certain details, we suspect that the most important details to recall would include: (i) the fact 
making the event criminal and (ii) the identity of the culprit.  Accordingly, we suspect that lack of memory 
regarding other details might be comparatively less relevant.   
182 Of course, more extreme approaches than those we set out here are possible, such as overruling 
Crawford, but such approaches are beyond the scope of this Article.  See, e.g., Brief of Fern and Charles 
Nesson as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 3, 9-10, White v. Louisiana, No. 18-8862 (Jun. 14, 
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that witnesses with partial memory loss—or certain types of partial memory loss—can 
meet the Confrontation Clause, but witnesses with complete memory loss cannot.   
There would be some logic to the Court taking the Middle approach and drawing 
some form of Confrontation Clause distinction between the situations of Alison (recalls 
incident but not statements), Bobby (recalls statements but not incident), and Caitlin 
(recalls neither incident nor statements).  The Court may feel, as it did in Owens, that the 
Clause necessitates only some “opportunity for effective cross-examination,” but not cross-
examination which is “effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent,” the defendant 
might seek.183   
For instance, a witness like Alison (recalls statements but not incident) or Bobby 
(recalls incident but not statements) might offer the defense some opportunity for cross-
examination on substantive matters,184 while the defense retains the ability to highlight the 
areas Alison and Bobby forget in order to diminish credibility.  In contrast, Caitlin (recalls 
neither incident nor statements) would not really afford the defense almost any substantive 
opportunity for cross-examination,185 and would merely permit the defendant to highlight 
her forgetfulness for the jury.186  The Court could draw support for such a Middle approach 
from Crawford’s footnote 9, in which the Court made two statements potentially in 
conflict: (i) “when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation 
Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements”; and (ii) 
“[t]he Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at 
trial to defend or explain it.”187  The former statement appears to support an Owens-Plus 
approach, but the latter appears to support a Middle approach.  Specifically, it would be 
nearly impossible for a witness like Caitlin (recalls neither incident nor statements) to 
                                                 
2019); see also David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and How, 88 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
115 (2012). 
183 Owens, 484 U.S. at 558-59 (emphasis in original and internal quotation marks omitted).   
184 For instance, in a case where the witness can at least recall making the statement, the “defendant can 
elicit testimony from such a witness about . . . whether he was under the influence of any substance at the 
time he made his statement; whether he felt any compulsive pressure from the police; or whether there were 
any other circumstances that created a motive to lie.”  NACDL Brief, supra note 177, at 9-10.  Again, a 
witness recalling the incident only and one recalling the statements only would arguably not offer the same 
degree of credibility testing, as discussed further below. 
185 See, e.g., Brief of Richard D. Friedman, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition For Writ of Certiorari, 
White v. Louisiana, No. 18-8862 (May 8, 2019) [hereinafter Friedman Brief] (“Others, such as those in this 
case, appear to believe that so long as the witness is able to appear and take an oath that is sufficient.  The 
Court should resolve this dispute, clarifying that the latter position makes a mockery of the Confrontation 
Clause.”); NACDL Brief, supra note 177, at 10 (“A declarant who, though he cannot recall witnessing the 
crime itself, can remember making his accusatory statement to the police may still be subject to useful, if 
imperfect, cross-examination.  But a declarant who . . . can recall neither the events he supposedly 
witnessed nor accusing the defendant, is no better than a witness who fails to appear for cross examination 
at all.”). 
186 See Claire L. Seltz, Sixth Amendment—The Confrontation Clause, Witness Memory Loss and Hearsay 
Exceptions: What are the Defendant's Constitutional and Evidentiary Guarantees—Procedure or 
Substance?, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 866, 896 (1988) (“Indeed, if carried to the greatest extreme, 
Justice Scalia’s reasoning [in Owens] would allow the admission of a prior, out-of-court identification of 
any willing witness on the stand who answers questions, even if all of the answers were ‘I forge[t]’ or ‘I do 
not know.’”) 
187 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9 (emphasis added and citations omitted); see also Friedman Brief, supra 
note 185, at 6-7.   
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explain or defend her statements, since the most she could do would be to testify that she 
cannot recall them.188 
As another example, the Court could see differences between the situations of 
Alison—who recalls the incident but not her statements—and Bobby—who recalls his 
statements but not the incident.  Arguably Alison would permit the defense a greater 
possibility for cross-examination than Bobby.  Alison’s recollection of the criminal 
incident would permit the defense to question Alison on all aspects of the alleged crime, 
whereas Bobby could not be questioned regarding what he saw or heard at the scene.  
Instead, the defense in Bobby’s case could only probe him on his belief at the time of 
making his statements to the police.  For this reason, the Court could determine that a 
witness like Bobby (recalls statements not incident) would not afford a defendant sufficient 
cross-examination, but a witness like Alison (recalls incident not statements) would. 
Since we take Owens as a baseline and assume a bright-line approach, we think it 
most likely that the Court would support either an Owens-Plus approach (memory loss no 
bar) or an extremely permissive version of the Middle approach (recollection of incident 
or statements sufficient).  If the Court opted for a permissive Middle approach, we believe 
one rule with some merit would be: the ability to answer any non-de minimis questions 
about the event or statement renders a witness sufficient for Confrontation Clause purposes.  
Although use of the term “non-de minimis” in particular still introduces some element of 
subjectivity, we believe it would be much easier for lower courts to consistently apply than 
using terms such as “substantial” or “substantive.”  “Non-de minimis” makes clear that 
nearly any recollection is sufficient, and should not require a court to excessively weigh 
the nature or degree of recollection. 
At a minimum, if the Court opts for any type of a Middle approach, we anticipate 
the Court would generally treat those who fully recall either the incident or their statements 
similarly.189  We think the Court could reasonably determine that a witness who recalls 
only the incident offers a greater opportunity for cross-examination than a witness who 
recalls only their statements.  However, in Owens, the Court found no violation of the 
Confrontation Clause where the witness could not recall seeing the assailant but could 
recall later identifying the accused as his assailant.190  Although the witness in Owens could 
                                                 
188 It is, perhaps, noteworthy that the witness in Owens not only recalled having subsequently identified the 
respondent, but he also recalled at least some piece of the incident, and this could have subtly influenced 
the Court.  See Owens, 484 U.S. at 556 (“Foster recounted his activities just before the attack, and 
described feeling the blows to his head and seeing blood on the floor.”). 
189 There are, however, many fine distinctions which could theoretically offer different degrees of witness 
credibility testing.  For instance, first, a witness could recall the facts stated in her former statement and 
vouch that they are true.  Second, the witness could recall making the statement and testify that: (a) “I do 
not recall the underlying facts, but I recall having made a true statement,” (b) “my statement must have 
been true,” (c) “if I said it, it was true,” (d) “I said it, but it was not true,” (e) “I did not say it and it was not 
true,” or (f) “I said it, but I cannot say whether it was true or not.”   Third, the witness could fail to recall 
whether she made the statement, and (a) deny the underlying facts reported in the statement, (b) affirm 
those underlying facts, (c) fail to recall those underlying facts, or (d) now tell a different story.  Fourth, the 
witness could refuse to avow or disavow the statement, while admitting that she made the statement.  
Although each of these situations could permit the defense a slightly different range and degree of cross-
examination, we suspect that the Court would not require lower courts to make such fine distinctions. 
190 Owens, 484 U.S. at 556.   
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seemingly recall some aspects relating to the incident,191 and although the Court could 
theoretically retrench from Owens, we think it is most likely that the Court would treat a 
witness like Alison (recalls incident not statements) and Bobby (recalls statement not 
incident) similarly. 
 
B. Simply Forgotten or Demonstrable-Cause Memory Loss 
 
Two individuals—Larry and Tammy—are slated to testify against accused 
murderers at upcoming trials.  Since giving statements to law enforcement immediately 
after the alleged murders, both have claimed complete memory loss.  Larry claims to have 
lost his memory due to it having been some time since the incident, and Tammy claims to 
have lost hers due to head trauma suffered in a car accident a few months after the incident.  
After Larry and Tammy provide their memory-impaired testimony at trial, the state seeks 
to enter their prior statements to law enforcement.  Would admission of such statements 
violate the Confrontation Clause?   
The question raised by the Larry and Tammy hypothetical is whether the law should 
treat someone who loses memory due to forgetfulness or the natural passage of time 
differently from someone who loses memory due to a demonstrable cause.  By 
“demonstrable cause” we mean recognized causes other than merely forgetting or having 
a poor memory, such as trauma or some type of clinical condition.  The Court could find 
that demonstrable-cause memory loss (here, Tammy’s head trauma) permits a slightly 
lesser opportunity to challenge credibility.  For instance, a cross-examiner in Larry’s case 
(natural forgetfulness) could seek to imply to the jury that if the murder really took place—
or took place the way Larry described it—Larry would recall it.  The same might not apply 
in Tammy’s case (memory loss due to head trauma), where the jury would presumably 
have an understandable rationale for her memory loss.  As such, the Court could take the 
position that the forgetful witness like Larry meets the Confrontation Clause but the witness 
suffering from demonstrable-cause memory loss like Tammy does not. 
There might also be reason for the Court to find that demonstrable-cause memory 
loss witnesses should meet the Confrontation Clause, at least in the case of certain causes.  
Consider, for instance, dementia as a cause.  Millions of Americans suffer from 
Alzheimer’s or other forms of dementia.192  As the U.S. population age 65-plus continues 
to increase in size and proportion, the number of Americans suffering from Alzheimer’s or 
other forms of dementia will only increase.193  This number is expected to escalate rapidly 
in the coming years.194  Given the scale of Alzheimer’s and dementia in the U.S., it is 
foreseeable that if individuals with such conditions are precluded from acting as 
Confrontation Clause witnesses, a great quantum of evidence would be excluded from U.S. 
                                                 
191 The Owens witness could recall certain parts of having been at the scene: activities directly prior to the 
attack, having felt blows to his head, and having seen blood on the floor.  Id. 
192 See Alzheimer’s Association, 2019 Alzheimer’s Disease Facts and Figures, 15 ALZHEIMER’S & 
DEMENTIA 321, 330 (2019); see also Ann M. Murphy, Vanishing Point: Alzheimer's Disease and Its 
Challenges to the Federal Rules Of Evidence, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1245, 1249 n. 5-9, 1276 (2012) (“It 
is beyond question that there will be a dramatic increase in the number of people within the justice system 
who suffer from [Alzheimer’s Disease] in the years ahead.”). 
193 Alzheimer’s Association, supra note 192, at 330. 
194 Id. 
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trials.195  Although the Supreme Court may choose to ignore practical considerations—
such as how their rule impacts law enforcement—the impact on law enforcement policy 
could be profound, and the Court should at least be aware of it.  By the same token, 
however, finding a demonstrable-cause memory loss witness sufficient means there might 
be a tremendous number of largely untested convictions.  
Drawing a distinction between memory loss due to simply forgetting and 
demonstrable-cause memory loss may be a difficult proposition, particularly given that 
there may not always be a sharp dividing line between the two.  Even with input from a 
trustworthy medical professional, it may not always be clear whether someone has an 
unusually poor memory, forgets events due to the natural passage of time, or is suffering 
from a known or unknown demonstrable condition.  Since we take Owens as a given and 
since we believe the Court will prefer a bright-line approach, we suspect that the Court’s 
rule will not turn solely on whether the memory loss is due to forgetfulness or a 
demonstrable cause.  We do believe that a witness suffering demonstrable-cause memory 
loss generally offers the defense a lesser opportunity for cross-examination than a witness 
who lost memory due to natural forgetfulness; however, we suspect the Court would not 
require lower courts and local stakeholders to make case-by-case determinations as to 
which is which.   
 
C. Memory Loss Initiated by Demonstrable Cause Prior to Statement or After Statement 
 
Mia and Jacklyn testify at different theft trials.  Both previously gave statements to 
law enforcement, and both now testify to having suffered complete memory loss.  Mia 
testifies to having complete memory loss at trial and her memory loss was triggered by a 
blow to the head suffered prior to giving statements to law enforcement.  Jacklyn suffered 
complete memory loss due to a blow to the head after giving her statements but prior to 
trial.  Should Mia and Jacklyn be treated differently from a Confrontation Clause 
standpoint? 
This hypothetical raises the issue of whether it should matter if the memory loss is 
initiated by a demonstrable cause prior to the statements to law enforcement or after such 
statements.  Memory loss initiated by a demonstrable cause prior to the statements—as in 
                                                 
195 This may be particularly problematic in the context of crimes lacking a statute of limitations, where 
dementia and related conditions could act as an informal statute of limitations in at least a percentage of 
cases.  See Grabbing the Bullcoming, supra note 174, at 546 (discussing risk of effective statute of 
limitation on murder in different context); see also Carolyn Zabrycki, Comment, Toward A Definition of 
“Testimonial”: How Autopsy Reports Do Not Embody the Qualities of a Testimonial Statement, 96 Calif. 
L. Rev. 1093, 1115 (2008) (same).  For instance, suppose that an accused had been recently charged with, 
among other things, murder in connection with the rape and killing of a female high school student that 
took place many years ago.  Assume there is no statute of limitations for murder in the state where charges 
are brought.  Around the time of the killing, an elderly janitor had informed the police that he witnessed the 
victim speak to the accused and get into the accused’s car, and then witnessed the car drive away.  Due to 
lack of other physical evidence at the time, however, the state did not have enough evidence to bring a case 
against the accused.  Years later, some physical evidence is uncovered implicating the perpetrator, but the 
state still needs the janitor’s testimony to make its case.  By the time charges are brought, the janitor is 
retired and has developed Alzheimer’s.  In a case such as this, even though state lawmakers specifically 
decided to leave open the possibility of bringing an action against an accused many years after a murder, 
the state would be effectively precluded from getting a conviction if a memory-impaired witness such as 
the janitor were insufficient for Confrontation Clause purposes. 
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Mia’s case—certainly seems to call credibility of the statements into question more than 
memory loss initiated by a demonstrable cause after the statements—as in Jacklyn’s case.  
The defense in Mia’s case (demonstrable cause prior to statements) might more easily 
imply that Mia’s statements could not even have been credible when made, given that her 
memory would already have been impaired when she initially made the statements.  In 
contrast, the defense in Jacklyn’s case (demonstrable cause after statements) would not 
have the opportunity to make a corresponding attack.   
The witness in Owens suffered memory loss as a result of injuries sustained during 
the course of the events recounted.196  When the FBI first attempted to interview the Owens 
witness, the FBI Agent found the witness “lethargic and unable to remember his attacker’s 
name.”197  It was only in a subsequent interview that the witness named Owens as his 
attacker.198  Although the Owens witness may not have permanently lost his memory prior 
to making the identification, the very fact that some memory loss could have taken place 
prior to the identification arguably provides the defense with an avenue to attack witness 
credibility in a way not available if the memory loss had been initiated by a demonstrable 
cause after the statements.199   
In setting its rule, the Court will need to decide whether to give such a credibility 
distinction decisive weight.  If the Court did seek to make a distinction between memory 
loss initiated by a demonstrable cause prior to the statement on one hand and memory loss 
initiated by a demonstrable cause after the statement on the other, the difficulties in any 
given case could include knowing if there was a demonstrable cause (as discussed above), 
understanding if the demonstrable cause came before the statement (particularly if the 
alleged cause is a clinical condition), and identifying when the memory loss was actually 
initiated.  In connection with initiation of the memory loss, should it need to be 
conclusively shown that some memory loss took place prior to the statements?  Would 
medical or other expert testimony be required?  Or, would it be sufficient that the defense 
could show that some memory loss could have taken place prior to the statement?  And, 
what if the witness lost some memory prior to the statement, regained complete memory 
after the statement without affirming or disaffirming the statement, but then completely 
lost memory prior to trial?  Given that we suspect the Court will adopt a bright-line 
approach which discourages case-by-case determinations, we anticipate that the Court will 
not require local courts to determine whether there is a demonstrable cause prior to the 
statement and when memory loss was initiated.  Accordingly, although we believe it is an 
important factor for credibility testing, we do not believe the Court’s rule will turn solely 
on whether the memory loss was initiated by a demonstrable cause prior to, or after, the 
statement.   
 
                                                 
196 Owens, 484 U.S. at 556. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. (noting the witness identified Owens “from an array of photographs.”). 
199 Id.; Friedman Brief, supra note 185, at 4 (“The witness [in White v. Louisiana] lost his memory 
suddenly as the result of an accident that occurred between the making of the statement and the trial.  The 
memory loss has no bearing whatsoever on the credibility of the witness in making the prior statement, but 
it provides a complete shield against any meaningful cross-examination.  The case is therefore materially 
different from [Owens], in which the witness was the victim of the assault and the cause of the memory loss 
was the assault itself; there, the witness’s bad memory may have cast some doubt on the credibility of the 
statement.”).  
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D. Accused Involved or Uninvolved with Memory Loss 
 
Mara and Roger are prosecution witnesses in upcoming battery and arson trials.  
Both witnesses were inside the relevant structures when the fires began, both informed 
officers on the scene about what they saw, and both have now suffered complete memory 
loss.  Mara’s memory loss was the direct result of the accused striking her on the head with 
a crowbar while attempting to flee the scene of the fire, but her memory loss did not set in 
until sometime after she made her statements to the officers.  Roger’s memory loss was 
unrelated to the incident or the accused, and resulted from an injury at work sometime after 
he made his statements to the officers.  If the state attempts to introduce Mara and Roger’s 
previous statements to officers in connection with their testimony, would the Confrontation 
Clause prevent admission of the statements?200  
An important question raised by this hypothetical is if it should matter whether a 
witness’s memory loss is caused by acts of the accused.  One could argue that, for reasons 
of fairness, if a witness’s inability to provide sufficient Confrontation Clause testimony 
resulted from wrongful acts of the accused, the accused should have forfeited her 
confrontation rights.  
In Crawford, the Court specifically accepted “forfeiture by wrongdoing” as a  
continuing “exception[] to the Confrontation Clause [.]”201  Currently, the leading case on 
this forfeiture exception is Giles v. California.202  In Giles, the Court considered whether a 
defendant would forfeit her Confrontation Clause right to cross-examine a witness when 
the defendant’s wrongful act caused the witness to be unavailable to testify.203  Justice 
Scalia, for the Court, found that the defendant would only forfeit his or her Confrontation 
Clause right if the defendant engages in conduct for the purpose, or designed, to prevent 
the witness’s testimony.204  Although Giles has been criticized,205 we assume for the 
purposes of this discussion that it represents the present state of the law on the forfeiture 
exception. 
                                                 
200 It is noteworthy that, like Mara, the Owens witness’s memory impairment resulted from injuries 
inflicted by the accused.  See Owens, 484 U.S. at 556. 
201 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.  The Crawford Court recognized that the forfeiture exception extinguished 
confrontation claims based on essentially equitable grounds.  Id. 
202 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
203 Id. at 355, 359.  In Giles, the accused had allegedly shot his girlfriend six times, and the state sought to 
introduce certain of her prior statements against him.  Id. at 356. 
204 Id. at 359-68.  There is some indication that, in certain circumstances, the requisite “intent” might be 
more broadly construed.  See, e.g., id. at 377 (“Acts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a 
victim from resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent testimony to police officers 
or cooperation in criminal prosecutions.  Where such an abusive relationship culminates in murder, the 
evidence may support a finding that the crime expressed the intent to isolate the victim and to stop her from 
reporting abuse to the authorities or cooperating with a criminal prosecution—rendering her prior 
statements admissible under the forfeiture doctrine.”); Eileen A. Scallen, Coping With Crawford: 
Confrontation of Children and Other Challenging Witnesses, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1558, 1571 
(2009). 
205 See, e.g., Scallen, supra note 204, at 1571 (“[I]nstead of establishing a bright-line rule, the Giles Court 
splintered, producing only a murky plurality decision.  All of the justices agreed that common law 
recognized a forfeiture doctrine that allowed ‘the introduction of statements of a witness who was 
‘detained’ or ‘kept away’ by the ‘means or procurement’ of the defendant.’  But the Court could not agree 
on the standard for finding forfeiture.”); Friedman Brief, supra note 185, at 2, 14-15. 
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Applying the Giles rule to Mara’s hypothetical situation (memory loss due to 
defendant striking her with a crowbar during incident), the accused in her case would still 
seemingly not have forfeited his confrontation rights, assuming he was intending to flee 
the scene when he struck Mara, not prevent her from testifying.  However, if the Court 
ultimately determines that memory loss can sometimes offend the Confrontation Clause, a 
rethinking of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine could help mitigate some of the 
negative law enforcement consequences which might follow.  Given that the forfeiture 
exception is based on equitable principles, it would certainly seem perverse for the accused 
in Mara’s case to benefit procedurally from having knocked her in the head with a 
crowbar.206  Although the Court need not revisit its interpretation of the forfeiture exception 
in clarifying its position in memory loss cases, it may be wise for the Court to at least 
consider doing so soon after. 
 
E. Genuine or Suspect Memory Loss 
 
Suppose James and Bella take the stand as prosecution witnesses in cybercrime 
trials, and both claim complete memory loss.  Further suppose that in James’s case, the 
defense suspects that James’s memory loss is fabricated.207  In Bella’s case, however, all 
involved parties agree that Bella’s memory loss is clearly genuine.208  When the state seeks 
to enter prior statements James and Bella provided to law enforcement, should the 
Confrontation Clause apply differently in each case? 
The above hypothetical raises the issue of how courts should treat suspect memory 
loss in the context of confrontation rights.  If the Court takes the position that in certain or 
all instances a memory-impaired witness is sufficient for the Confrontation Clause, courts 
will ultimately be faced with situations where a witness lies about having suffered memory 
loss.  For instance, in the above hypothetical, suppose James (suspected of fabricating 
memory loss) was the true perpetrator of the cybercrime and he invented his prior 
statements to law enforcement in order to help convict the accused.  Suppose further that 
James is now concerned that there could be inconsistencies between his prior statements 
and his present testimony on the stand, and so he feigns complete memory loss. 
Should the Court eventually face this issue, we suspect that the Court would rely 
on cross-examination of the witness at trial to uncover any fabricated memory loss.  Cross-
examination appears fit to this purpose, and is otherwise relied upon in the Confrontation 
Clause context to test reliability and credibility.209 
 
F. Memory Loss Versus Assertion of Privilege 
 
Imagine Megan and Stewart testify for the prosecution in securities-related criminal 
matters.  Both have provided statements to government regulators prior to the trials.  Megan 
                                                 
206 Friedman Brief, supra note 185, at 2, 14-15. 
207 Perhaps, for example, James’s behavior and actions suggest he may actually recall his prior statements 
and the criminal event. 
208 Perhaps, for instance, voluminous medical records and the opinions of respected medical personnel 
would support the genuineness of Bella’s memory loss. 
209 See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 57-69 (“[The Confrontation Clause] commands, not that evidence be 
reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-
examination.”); Owens, 484 U.S. at 557-61; Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 661-62 (2011). 
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takes the stand, but then asserts her privilege against self-incrimination in response to all 
the questions posed to her.  When Stewart takes the stand, due to complete memory loss, 
he answers “I cannot recall” to all the questions posed to him.  If the defense raises a 
Confrontation Clause objection to admission of Megan and Stewart’s prior statements, 
should the statements be excluded? 
This hypothetical raises the question of whether the Confrontation Clause should 
apply differently in assertion of privilege cases and complete memory loss cases.  The 
Supreme Court has already had occasion to rule on the assertion of privilege issue in 
Douglas v. Alabama.210  In Douglas, a witness had asserted the privilege against self-
incrimination and “refused to answer any questions concerning the alleged crime.”211  
Nevertheless, the state solicitor had the witness declared a hostile witness and was able to 
read the witness’s confession at trial as part of cross-examining the witness.212  The 
Supreme Court found that the accused’s inability to cross-examine the witness regarding 
the alleged confession violated the Confrontation Clause.213  
Applying Douglas to Megan’s hypothetical case (assertion of privilege), the court 
would likely exclude Megan’s prior statements.214  One might argue, then, that Stewart’s 
(complete memory loss) prior statements should also be excluded.  After all, a witness 
answering substantive questions with “I cannot recall” would hardly seem to offer a greater 
degree of cross-examination than one asserting privilege in connection with those same 
questions.   
On the other hand, there are at least two possibly relevant distinctions between 
memory loss and privilege.  First, the assertion of privilege is generally a voluntary 
decision, whereas genuine memory loss is normally involuntary.215  Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, in a memory loss case, the defense can attack the witness’s credibility 
by forcing the witness to repeatedly answer “I cannot recall” in front of the jury.  The 
testimony of a witness like Stewart—who cannot recall anything about the incident or 
statements he purportedly gave to police—may raise serious doubts in the jury’s mind as 
to the accuracy and credibility of his statements.216  In contrast, the testimony of a witness 
like Megan—who simply asserts privilege—would not afford the defendant a 
corresponding opportunity to attack her credibility in front of the jury.217  Accordingly, we 
                                                 
210 380 U.S. 415 (1965). 
211 Id. at 416. 
212 Id. at 416-17.  Three law enforcement officers then identified the confession document, but although it 
was marked as an exhibit, it was not entered into evidence.  Id. at 417. 
213 Id. at 419.  The Court noted that “[a]lthough the Solicitor’s reading of [the witness’s] alleged statement, 
and [the witness’s] refusals to answer, were not technically testimony, the Solicitor’s reading may well 
have been the equivalent in the jury’s mind of testimony that [the witness] in fact made the statement; and 
[the witness’s] reliance upon the privilege created a situation in which the jury might improperly infer both 
that the statement had been made and that it was true.”  Id. 
214 For purposes of the hypothetical, we will assume that the lower court finds that Douglas remains good 
law. 
215 However, death is often an involuntary condition and it is unclear that the Court would treat death and 
complete memory loss similarly.  Death is further removed than privilege, of course, in that the defendant 
at least has the literal opportunity to face a witness asserting privilege at trial. 
216 As Justice Scalia stated in Owens, “a defendant seeking to discredit a forgetful expert witness is not 
without ammunition, since the jury may be persuaded that ‘his opinion is as unreliable as his memory.’”  
Owens, 484 U.S. at 558 (citing Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 19). 
217 Of course, depending on the privilege claimed, in some instances the jury may in fact believe the 
witness is hiding something. 
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do not believe that the Court would feel constrained to treat assertion of privilege and 
complete memory loss similarly. 
 
G. Child Versus Adult Memory Loss 
 
Jenny, 5 years old, had told police one year ago about an incident of sexual abuse 
involving her father.  Jenny’s father has now been charged with crimes relating to the 
alleged assault.  Upon taking the stand at her father’s trial today, Jenny testified that she 
was no longer able to recall the incident or her statements to the police.  She testified that 
she was not aware of any specific reason for her memory loss and that she had no reason 
to doubt that she would have been truthful at the time.  The state seeks to enter Jenny’s out-
of-court statements to the police as evidence against Jenny’s father.  Should the 
Confrontation Clause bar their entry?  
If the Supreme Court takes the position that a witness with complete memory loss 
is insufficient for Confrontation Clause purposes, the above hypothetical raises the 
question of whether the Court would treat child statements differently.  The Court might 
be sensitive to how interpretations of the Confrontation Clause impact the hearsay 
statements of children, in particular in cases involving child sexual abuse and domestic 
violence.218  As one commenter notes: 
 
[P]olicy and public pressure on the courts mitigate in favor of interpretations 
that allow continued use of child hearsay exceptions. . . . Because of the 
damaging impact to prosecutions in the already politically-charged context 
of child sexual abuse, there will be public pressure on courts to narrow the 
definition of testimonial statements, and to expand the scope of other 
exceptions, to minimize Crawford's impact.  This public and political 
pressure, as well as the uncertainty about whether Crawford’s mandates will 
further the truth-seeking goals of confrontation, supports lower court 
interpretations that minimize or eliminate any impact Crawford may have 
on child hearsay exceptions and protective in-court procedures for child 
witnesses.219 
 
                                                 
218 See, e.g., Paul F. Rothstein, Ambiguous-Purpose Statements of Children and Other Victims of Abuse 
under the Confrontation Clause, 44 SW. L. REV. 508, 551-52 (2015); Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford's 
Impact on Hearsay Statements in Domestic Violence and Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 
411 (2005) [hereinafter Crawford’s Impact]; Michael H. Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face 
Confrontation: Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 19 (1985); 
Laurie E. Martin, Child Abuse Witness Protections Confront Crawford v. Washington, 39 IND. L. REV. 113 
(2005); Scallen, supra note 204; Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay 
Doctrine Under the Challenge of Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691 (1993) 
[Remaking Confrontation Clause]; Ohio v. Clark, 135 S. Ct. 2173, 2181-83 (2015); Friedman Brief, supra 
note 185, at 7 n. 2.  It is noteworthy that use of hearsay may be particularly important in this context.  See, 
e.g., Crawford’s Impact, supra note 218, at 426 (“Cases involving child sexual abuse and domestic 
violence are particularly susceptible to negative consequences because they often critically depend on 
hearsay to prove the case.  Domestic violence cases in particular rely on statements especially likely to be 
considered testimonial because they are given to government agents in a context that suggests to everyone 
involved that a criminal prosecution is likely to ensue.”). 
219 See, e.g., Martin, supra note 218, at 142-143. 
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Another commenter has argued, for instance: 
 
[B]ecause children obviously differ from adults, society is willing to rethink 
procedures and evidentiary rules.  We begin almost with a presumption that 
the ground rules should be different.  Thus, the initial inquiry is what 
changes to make in the process rather than whether it should be altered at 
all.  That inquiry, in turn, quickly moves to how fundamental the 
modifications should be.220    
 
As such, the Court could—at least in theory—seek to interpret confrontation rules 
differently in connection with memory impairment in children.221 
If the Court did choose to set a different confrontation rule in child memory loss 
cases, the challenge would be how technically and consistently to so.  One option would 
be for the Court to set a separate bright-line rule for children, the most obvious of which 
being that the Owens-Plus approach222 applies to those below a certain age, even though it 
does not apply to those at or above that age.  While possibly expedient, setting a fair and 
reasonable bright-line rule for child witnesses might be difficult.  Another option would be 
for the Court to adopt some type of case-by-case approach, where courts would be required 
to balance the protection and well-being of the relevant child with the defendant’s 
confrontation rights.223  Perhaps this would entail the prosecution making a sufficient 
showing of necessity224 or perhaps the Court would look to a set or open list of factors, 
such the age and sophistication of the child, the cause of the memory loss, the degree of 
memory loss, which details are recalled and which are not recalled, and the defendant’s 
actions.  As previously noted, we think the Court might be disinclined to use such a 
balancing approach where the defendant’s confrontation rights are at issue,225 and Justice 
Scalia in Crawford specifically derided the subjective reliability approach that had existed 
under the Roberts regime.226 
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We suspect that the Supreme Court would not choose to address memory loss in 
children unless the issue were directly raised to the Court.  However, since lower courts 
are likely to face the issue prior to it reaching the Supreme Court, we think it is important 
that the Court at least consider the implications of any rule it sets for child witnesses.  
Specifically, if the Court takes a position other than the Owens-Plus approach, it should at 
least contemplate further developing the concept it raised in Ohio v. Clark that, under the 
primary purpose test, the statements of very young children “will rarely, if ever, implicate 
the Confrontation Clause.”227  In determining whether a statement is testimonial, the 
primary purpose test analyzes whether the objective primary purpose of the conversation 
is to create a substitute for trial testimony; in Clark, the Court stated it was “extremely 
unlikely that a 3–year–old child in [the witness’s] position would intend his statements to 
be a substitute for trial testimony.”228  If the Court were to expand upon this principle, it 
might help mitigate any potential negative consequences for children flowing from the 
memory loss rule the Court ultimately sets.229 
 
H. Expert or Lay Witness 
 
  Dr. Marie Planck conducted a forensic analysis which tied an accused to the crime.  
After having rendered the analysis and authored a report on its findings, Dr. Planck suffered 
complete memory loss.  She could not recall being engaged to conduct the analysis, 
conducting the analysis, authoring the report, the basis for the report or whether it was 
accurate, or any other facts and circumstances regarding the analysis or the crime.  No one 
else was involved in the analysis or the report’s creation, nor did anyone review or approve 
the report.  It is not possible to now retest the samples.  Dr. Planck takes the stand at the 
accused’s trial to support admission of her forensic report, but she is only able to testify 
that she lacks all memory of the facts and circumstances surrounding the report and the 
crime.  Should the Confrontation Clause bar admission of her report? 
 In recent years, the Confrontation Clause’s application to expert witnesses and 
forensic reports has been hotly debated.230  The relevant question for the purposes of this 
Article is whether the law would treat an expert witness with complete memory loss 
differently than a similarly situated lay witness.  In Fensterer, the Court found no 
Confrontation Clause violation in admitting an expert’s opinion when the expert could not 
recall the theory forming its basis, noting that the expert’s impaired memory could be 
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illustrated to the jury to diminish reliability of the evidence.231  It is noteworthy that the 
expert in Fensterer did not appear to lose all memory of the relevant facts and 
circumstances of the case, given that he was still able to explain at trial that there were 
three methods for determining that a hair was forcibly removed (even if he could not recall 
which one was used to form the basis of his opinion), and that a hair was forcibly 
removed.232  The Fensterer Court did not foreclose the possibility that more extreme 
memory loss could lead to a violation of confrontation rights.233  A witness like Dr. 
Planck—who forgets all facts and circumstances regarding the case or report—certainly 
seems to present a more extreme case than in Fensterer. 
 The Court could decide to treat memory-impaired expert witnesses differently than 
their lay counterparts.  For instance, one commenter has argued that, since an expert’s 
testimony consists of such expert’s opinion, where the expert is unable to recall the basis 
of the opinion, the expert’s memory loss may be seen as “self-impeaching” in a way not 
applicable to all memory loss contexts.234  The commenter notes that an expert who cannot 
recall the basis of his opinion—such as the expert in Fensterer—may appear to a jury as 
less of an “expert” and the jury may readily discount his opinion.235  In contrast, the 
commenter states that a lay witness who offers an identification of an attacker—such as 
the witness in Owens—may be seen by a jury as credible but simply forgetful.236   
On the other hand, the Court could decide to treat expert and lay witnesses 
similarly. Crawford replaced the Roberts reliability approach with a focus on the 
procedural right to cross-examination.  From a procedural standpoint, it is unclear that an 
expert like Dr. Planck offers the defense a much greater opportunity for cross-examination 
than a lay witness would.   
Moreover, although the Court has been sharply divided, a majority of the Court has, 
so far, seemed unwilling to draw a bright-line distinction between scientific witnesses and 
other types of witnesses in the forensic report context.237  The view that analysts and 
conventional witnesses should be treated similarly is exemplified by the opinion of Justice 
Scalia, writing for the Court, in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.238  In contrast, Justice 
Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in Melendez-Diaz represents the opposing view.239  Justice 
Kennedy chided the Court for not seeking to acknowledge the “real differences” between 
conventional witnesses on the one hand and laboratory analysts who had performed tests 
on the other.240  According to Justice Kennedy, the Confrontation Clause’s text referred to 
types of persons, specifically “witnesses against” a defendant.241  Laboratory analysts were 
not “witnesses against” the accused as understood at the framing, and the Clause instead 
targeted conventional witnesses, i.e. those who perceive an event giving them personal 
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knowledge of an aspect of a defendant’s guilt.242  According to Justice Kennedy, analysts 
were distinct from conventional witnesses in at least three ways: (i) conventional witnesses 
recalled past events while analysts’ reports contained near-contemporaneous observations; 
(ii) analysts observed neither the crime itself, nor any human action relating to it; and (iii) 
conventional witnesses responded to questions under interrogation, while laboratory tests 
did not.243  Justice Scalia disagreed, and found Justice Kennedy’s three purported 
distinctions unavailing.244 
Even though the issue was divisive and even though Justices Gorsuch and 
Kavanaugh have now replaced Justices Scalia and Kennedy, it remains unclear that the 
Court would rethink its position on treating analysts and lay witnesses similarly.245  We 
anticipate Justice Gorsuch’s general position on the Confrontation Clause and forensic 
reports will be more similar to that of Justice Scalia than to that of Justice Kennedy,246 and 
we would guess that the current Court would not draw a bright-line distinction between 
analysts and conventional witnesses in the forensic report context.  For similar reasons, 
although analysts are only a subset of experts, we would suspect that the Court might also 
be hesitant to apply a different confrontation standard to expert and lay witnesses in the 
memory loss context.   
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The purpose of this Article was to identify and discuss eight key issues arising in 
connection with memory impairment in Confrontation Clause witnesses.  Although the 
Court chose not to put these eight issues to bed in the context of White or Tapia, these are 
the issues we anticipate federal and state courts will be called upon to answer in the coming 
years, and we suspect the Supreme Court will eventually need to answer them.   
Assuming that Owens continues to be precedent and that the Court prefers a bright-
line approach, there would be some appeal to the Owens-Plus approach, i.e. an approach 
under which complete memory loss witnesses can afford a defendant her confrontation 
rights.  Setting a constitutional line which treats certain categories of memory-impaired 
witnesses differently from others would be difficult, and it would become infinitely more 
so if the Court required greater scrutiny of what individual details were and were not 
recalled.  This may be why Justice Scalia in Owens appeared unwilling to engage in line-
setting,247 and it could also subtly encourage the Court to adopt an Owens-Plus type 
approach. 
However, there might also be instances where the Court feels a memory-impaired 
witness simply offers the defense an insufficient basis to test credibility.  For instance, 
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imagine a witness suffered complete memory loss due to a well-documented, completely 
understandable medical condition which arose only after she offered her statements to law 
enforcement.  In such an instance, the Court may fee that even the bare opportunity to show 
the jury that the witness forgets may not afford the defense sufficient opportunity to attack 
credibility, since there would be a ready explanation for the memory loss (the documented 
clinical condition) and the memory loss would not necessarily call the prior statements into 
question (since the memory loss took place after the statements).   
If the Court did choose to require some greater degree of credibility testing than 
what an Owens-Plus approach would necessitate, we think one rule which has merit is that 
witnesses who can answer any non-de minimis questions about the event or their statement 
are sufficient for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.  Although use of “de minimis” still 
requires some subjective determinations on the part of local courts, it seems much less 
subjective than other options—such as “substantial” or “substantive”—and should clearly 
reflect that in all but the most extreme instances, memory impairment will not render a 
witness insufficient. 
Since the Supreme Court opted not to clarify the law in this area using White or 
Tapia, lower courts and local stakeholders must continue to seek guidance from the 
existing precedent.  Our suspicion is that, if nothing else, the Court will at least continue to 
recognize Owens and the notion that only some satisfactory basis to challenge credibility 
is required.  We hope that this Article helps clarify the relevant issues and focuses more 
academic attention on the area of memory loss and the Confrontation Clause.  
 
